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Recent Decisions
CORPORATIONS-FUNDS AVAILABLE FOR PAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS-
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX
A Virginia corporation, having paid a surtax on its undis-
tributed profits as required by the 1936 Federal Revenue Act,
sought a refund under a 1942 amendment to the Act which allowed
credits retroactively to corporations which were restricted by state
law from paying dividends during the existence of a deficit in
accumulated earnings. Held, district Court reversed, refund denied.
The Virginia statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 3870 (1942), (dividends
may be paid out of net earnings, or out of net assets in excess of
capital) did not prohibit payment of dividends despite a capital
deficit, where there were current net earnings. United States v.
Riley, 169 F. 2d 542 (4th Cir. 1948).
A month later, in a similar case involving Michigan dividend
law (from earned surplus or from net earnings) a refund was
denied a Michigan corporation, following the Riley case. Grand
Traverse Hotel Co. v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 860 (W.D. Mich.
1948). This Michigan statute has now been amended, authorizing
payment of dividends, only from "surplus."
The Virginia and Michigan statutory provisions regulating
dividends are by no means unusual. Similar provisions are found
in Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, and Tennessee; and with but slight
variations in Connecticut (net profits or actual surplus), Indiana
(surplus earnings or net profits or surplus paid in cash), and North
Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, New Jersey (surplus or net
profits).
The problem presented in the interpretation of such statutes is
twofold: (1) do they give an alternative fund for dividends? (2) if
so, what is meant by "net profits" or "net earnings."
Although at first glance it would appear that an alternative fund
is provided, neither the courts nor the text writers agree that such
is the case. Ballentine suggests that the terms "surplus or net
profits" even when combined are simply part of a description of
surplus and concludes that the history of the New Jersey statute
conclusively shows an intention to create alternative funds. Ballen-
tine and Hill, Corporate Capital and Restrictions upon Dividends
under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. REV. 229, 241
(1935) ; BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS 583 (1946) ; BALLENTINE AND
KEHL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS 60 (1941).
Assuming that an alternative fund is created, the problem re-
mains as to what is meant by "net profit" or "net earnings."
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Profits, without specifying some particular period, has not been
considered to mean current profits. BALLENTINE, CORPORATIONS
575 (Rev. ed. 1946). Some courts seek to distinguish between "net
profits" and "net earnings." Mengel Co. v. Glenn, 50 F. Supp. 765,
769 (W.D. Ky. 1943). Though the terms may possess different
shades of meaning, it is doubtful whether there is any substantial
disagreement. Rain, The Fund Available for Corporate Dividends
in Texas, 26 TEx. L. REV. 273, 285 (1948). There seems to be no
settled usage regarding these terms in commerce, and in view of
this ambiguity their incorporation in the statutes render the law
extremely vague. Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend
Law, 29 COL. L. REV. 461, 474 (1929).
The North Carolina statute allowing payment of dividends out
of "surplus or net profits," has been construed by the supreme court
of the state to mean "that which remains after deducting from
present value of all assets the amount of all liabilities, including
capital stock." Cannon v. Wiscasset Mills Co., 195 N.C. 119, 125,
141 S.E. 344, 348 (1928). But it is argued-that the North Carolina
statute legally permits dividends out of current net profits, even
though a capital deficit exists. Sparger, Profits, Surplus and the
Payment of Dividends, 8 N.C. L. REV. 14, 21 (1929).
In the construction of provisions to be included in a prospective
preferred stock issue, the court held that "net profits" meant the
accumulated profits, and that current earnings were not available
for distribution in view of previous operating losses. National
Newark and Essex Banking Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 124 N.J. Eq.
213, 1 A. 2d 316 (Ch. 1938) ; aff'd 125 N.J. Eq. 435, 5 A. 2d 767
(Ct. Err. & App. 1939); accord, Lich v. U. S. Rubber Co., 39 F.
Supp. 675 (D. N.J. 1941), aff'd without opinion, 123 F. 2d 145 (3d
Cir. 1941) ; Mengel Co. v. Glenn, supra. Contra, Borg v. Int. Silver
Co., 11 F. 2d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 1945).
The Delaware statute which was similar to that of New Jersey
was held to be insufficient to permit payment out of current earn-
ings where a deficit existed. Wittenberg v. Federal Mining &
Smelting Co., 15 Del. Ch. 147, 133 Atl. 43 (1926).
Thus it has frequently been held that the apparent alternative
fund for dividends does not allow dividends in the face of a capital
deficit, and that accumulated net earnings are required. This is in
accord with the general concept of corporation law which precludes
payment of dividends from current earnings in face of capital
impairment, failing explicit statutory provisions therefore. Weiner,
Amount Available for Dividends Where No Par Shares Have Been
Issued, 29 COL. L. REV. 906, 909 (1929).
In a suit for a tax refund, as in the principal case, a refund was
granted a Michigan corporation, the court pointing out that had the
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legislature intended to limit net earnings to a particular year it
would have been a simple matter to do so by the insertion of the
words "annual" or "current." Senior Investment Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 2 T.C. 124, 143 (1943). A number of states have so pro-
vided, among them Delaware and Minnesota.
The wisdom of allowing corporations to pay dividends when
their capital is impaired is much debated. Ballentine and Hill,
Corporate Capital and Restrictions Upon Dividends Under Modern
Corporation Law, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 229, 247 (1935) ; Rain, supra,
at 236. It is significant that in the states where current net earnings
are expressely available for dividends despite a deficit, provisions
are made for the protection of preferred .stockholders, and creditors,
whereas such protection is lacking in the Michigan and Virginia
statutes as interpreted in the principal case.
The surtax imposed during the depression to prevent accu-
mulation of funds was bitterly opposed even after the tax was
removed. The result was the extraordinary amendment providing
retroactive refunds, the purpose being to relieve the dilemma re-
sulting from the imposition of the federal tax on profits non-
distributable as dividends under state law. The directors of the
corporations in Michigan and Virginia Were certainly faced with
this problem, and by the decisions in the principal case the cor-
porations were penalized for failure to declare dividends when a
capital deficit existed. By the interpretation of the state law in the
principal case the court has in effect stimulated a defunct tax law,
the ill effects of which Congress expressly remedied by amendment.
C. Stanley Taylor
CRIMINAL LAW-TAKING OF SEPARATELY-OWNED PROPERTY
AS MULTIPLE OFFENSES
Defendant "hijacked" a truck containing property severally
owned. The indictment charged eight violations of the National
Stolen Property Act, 37 STAT. 670 (1913), as amended, 18 U.S.C.
sec. 409 (now 659), naming different property and a different
owner in each count. The defendant was convicted on all counts
and sentences were imposed to run concurrently on some counts
and consecutively on others. Defendant moved to vacate the sen-
tences imposed which were to be served consecutively. Held, motion
denied. The taking of merchandise belonging to different owners
and constituting independent shipments, though contained in one
vehicle, may be regarded as separate offenses for which separate
punishment can be imposed. Oddo v. United States, 171 F. 2d 854
(2d Cir. 1949).
The court said, "The intention of congress, we believe, in enact-
ing section 409 was to protect each and every interstate shipment
1949]
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of goods against felonious taking." The statute construed in the
principal case was enacted, in 1913 and, as the court points out,
there is no controlling authority for the proposition it finds. The
lack of indictments charging separate offences, during the thirty-
six years of enforcement, indicates that there is no clear manifes-
tation of congressional intent to protect several ownership. "Penal
statutes are to be strictly construed and statutes will not be read to
create crimes, or new degrees or classes of crimes unless the pur-
pose so to do is plain." United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201, 204
(1926). "A law creating a crime ought to be explicit and any
ambiguity and uncertainty about the meaning of the criminal
statute ought to be resolved by a strict interpretation in favor of
the liberty of the citizen." Ex Parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 689
(1911). "General terms should be so limited in their application as
not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence."
United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall 482, 486 (U.S. 1868).
The courts have struggled with the problem presented here
since early times. The common law of England dictates the prop-
osition that the stealing of goods, at one and the same time, belong-
ing to different persons is but one larceny. United States v. Beer-
man, 24 Fed. Cas. 1065 (1838) (dissent). Citing the dissent in that
case a court held, to divide one larceny into several offences because
there were several owners of the property is contrary to the con-
stitutional guaranty against double jeopardy and the spirit of the
common law. Hoiles v. United States, 3 MacArthur 370, 36 Am.
Rep. 106 (Ga. 1881) ; Chanock v. United States, 267 F. 612 (App.
D.C. 1920).
In the principal case the court cited Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S.
632 (1915) ; United States v. Bush, 64 F. 2d 27 (2d Cir. 1933) ;
and Carpenter v. Hudspeth, 112 F. 2d 126 (10th Cir. 1940) for the
proposition that the test of the identity of offenses, when double
jeopardy is set up, is whether the evidence sustaining one indict-
ment or count would have proved the other indictment or count.
In those cases a distinct act was charged in each count. The only
difference in the counts in the principal case is the ownership of
the property. The federal court and the majority of states have
held that the taking at the same time and place of the property of
different persons is but one offense. The federal court said, "The
commission of a crime is an offense against the public, and is pun-
ished, not to protect the property rights of injured individuals, but
rather as a vindication of the public law. The name of the owner
appears in a proper indictment for the purpose of identifying the
ownership of the property stolen or converted. The particular
ownership of the property which is the subject of larceny does not
fall within the definition and is not of the essence of the crime. The
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gist of the offense consists in feloniously taking the property of
another, and neither the legal nor the moral quality of the act is at
all effected by the fact that the property stolen, instead of being
owned by one, or by two or more jointly, is the several property of
different persons." Henry v. United States, 263 F. 459 ,463 (App.
D.C. 1919). Clemm v. State, 154 Ala. 12, 45 So. 212 (1907) ; Sweek
v. The People, 85 Colo. 479, 277 Pac. 1 (1929) ; State v. Paul, 81
Iowa 597, 47 N.W. 539 (1891) ; Furnace v. The State, 153 Ind. 93,
54 N.E. 441 (1899) ; People v. Israel 269 Ill. 284, 109 N.E. 969
(1915) ; State v. Nelson, 29 Me. 329 (1849) ; Jacobs v. Common-
wealth, 260 Ky. 142, 84 S.W. 2d 84 (1935) ; Ward v. State, 90 Miss.
249, 43 So. 466 (1907) ; State v. Wagner, 118 Mo. 626, 24 S.W. 178
(1893) ; State v. Warren, 77 Md. 121, 26 Atl. 500 (1893) ; People v.
Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 N.W. 1119 (1890) ; State v. Mjelde, 29
Mont. 490, 75 Pac. 87 (1904) ; State v. Douglas, 26 Nev. 196, 65 Pac.
802 (1901) ; State v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361 (1833) ; State v. Klasner,
19 N.M. 474, 145 Pac. 679 (1915) ; Smith v. State, 59 Ohio St. 350,
52 N.E. 826 (1898) ; State v. Clark, 46 Ore. 140, 80 Pac. 101 (1905) ;
Folmer v. Commonwealth, 97 Pa. 503 (1881) ; Wilson v. State, 45
Tex. 76 (1876) ; State v. Mickel, 23 Utah 507, 65 Pac. 484 (1901) ;
State v. Baker, 100 Vt. 380, 138 AtI. 736 (1927); Alexander v.
Commonwealth, 90 Va. 809, 20 S.E. 782 (1894) ; Ackerman v. State,
7 Wyo. 504, 54 Pac. 162 (1898) ; State v. Bliss, 27 Wash. 463, 68
Pac. 87 (1902).
The most frequent cases cited in this area come under the Mann
Act and the Mail Statute. It is a single offense to transport in inter-
state commerce several prostitutes in the same vehicle at one time.
Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F. 2d 545 (10th Cir. 1940); Robinson
v. United States, 143 F. 2d 276 (10th Cir. 1944). But more recent
cases hold the transportation of more than one woman on the same
trip in the same vehicle constitutes a separate offense for each
woman. Crespo v. United States, 151 F. 2d 44 (1st Cir. 1945);
United States v. St. Clair, 62 F. Supp. 795 (W.D. Va. 1945).
Habeas Corpus denied, 83 F. Supp. 585 (N.D. Ga. 1949). These
cases are predicated on the idea that the introduction into the car
of each woman is an act in itself and therefore a separate crime.
Thus they are distinguishable from the principal case. The statute
says any woman or any women and the court points to that language
as authority for holding separate offenses.
It was held that cutting into each of several mail bags (separate
acts) in a railway postal car constituted separate crimes for which
the defendant could be separately punished. Ebeling v. Morgan,
237 U.S. 625 (1914). But where the defendant was charged with
abstracting three different parcels from a mail pouch the court held
the charge to be of but one crime. Johnston v. Lagomarsino, 88 F.
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2d 86 (9th Cir. 1937), and where the indictment charged in separate
counts the taking of several mail bags, identifying each bag in a
separate count by giving the lock number, the court held one
offense. Colson c. Johnston, 35 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1940);
Kerr v. Squier, 151 F. 2d 308 (9th Cir. 1945).
It would seem that the taking in the principal case was a single
act. The ownership of the property taken is material only in that
it is necessary that the property taken is owned by someone other
than the accused. The intent and moral culpability would have been
the same had the property been owned by one individual. Trespass
to the possession is the gist of the crime and in this case the
transportation company had possession as bailee.
John G. MeCune
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
The defendant was arrested without a warrant on suspicion of
grand larceny. He was held for thirty hours before being brought
before a committing magistrate, the detention being admittedly for
the purpose of furnishing an opportunity for further interrogation.
Confessions of guilt elicited from him during this 30-hour period,
without which he could not have been convicted, were admitted in
evidence by the District Court for the District of Columbia against
his objections that they had been illegally obtained. His conviction
of grand larceny was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the case
went to the Supreme Court on certioari. Held, reversed (5-4). A
confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due to a
failure to promptly carry a prisoner before a committing magis-
trate, regardless of whether the confession is the result of torture,
physical or psychological. Upshaw v. United States, 335 U. S. 410
(1948).
The court rested its decision on Rule 5 (a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A., which provides that "An officer
making an arrest . . . shall take the arrested person without un-
necessary delay before the nearest available" committing magis-
trate, and its holding in MeNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943), that the obvious purpose of the above requirement of
prompt production was to check resort by officers to "secret inter-
rogations of persons accused of crime." In the McNabb case, con-
fessions obtained during a longer period of illegal detention than
existed in the principal case and with some degree of coercion
present were held inadmissible. No mention was made of Anderson
v. United States, 318 U.S. 350 (1943), decided the same day as the
McNabb case, where a confession was excluded that resulted from
merely two hours' questioning, but United States v. Mitchell, 322
U.S. 65 (1944), where an illegal eight-day detention subsequent to
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the obtaining of a voluntary confession was held not to render the
confession inadmissible, was distinguished on the basis that the
Mitchell confession had been obtained before the illegal detention
commenced.
The court asserts in the principal case that its intention in
formulating the McNabb rule was to exercise its power of control
over the admissibility of evidence in an effort to impose an effective
sanction upon police officers for failure to effect "prompt produc-
tion." Prior to this assertion, a state of confusion persisted in the
lower federal courts as to the function and scope of the rule. See
Note, 47 COL. L. REV. 1214 (1947). It was uncertain whether the
exclusion of confessions on the theory of the McNabb rule should
be regarded as a sanction or as an extension of the constitutional
prohibition against coerced confessions and, consequently, whether
the basis of exclusion to be applied should be the mere illegal deten-
tion, in which case the voluntary nature of the confession would be
immaterial to its exclusion, United States v. Hoffman, 137 F. 2d
416 (2d Cir. 1943), or a coercion test, in which case the illegal
detention would have to amount to a physical or psychological pres-
sure destroying the voluntary nature of the confession before it
would be excluded, Ruht v. United States, 148 F. 2d 173 (10th Cir.
1945), Brinegar v. United States, 165 F. 2d 512 (10th Cir. 1947).
With the adoption of the rule of the principal case, the mere
illegal detention becomes the sole criterion governing the exclusion
of confessions under this rule. Since only "unnecessary delays" are
made illegal by Rule 5 (a), supra, the obvious answer of necessity
would meet any challenge on this ground; but, as the court points
out in the principal case, any detention made for the purpose of
eliciting a confession cannot be considered necessary, so any con-
fession obtained during such a detention would be excluded.
In distinguishing the Mitchell case, supra, on the basis of a
"subsequent illegal detention" argument, the court has denied the
applicability of the trespass ab initio doctrine to this area, although
protection of the individual from abuses by public officers was one
of the few logical arguments accepted in support of the doctrine.
At the same time, the court imposes a test involving the intent of
the arresting or detaining officer as an essential consideration in
the determination of the necessity of the delay. Carried to its logical
conclusion, the latter test could result in just as grave an abuse of
justice as application of the trespass ab initio doctrine; any con-
fession, notwithstanding its voluntary nature, made after or during
the slightest delay following an arrest should be held inadmissible
if the requisite intent can be established as the delay would be
rendered unnecessary and, therefore, illegal. The length of the
detention period is significant only as a possible aid to the confessor
1949]
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in establishing lack of necessity for the delay in production. It
cannot be contended that the confession must be the result of the
illegal detention as this would compel a consideration of physical or
psychological pressure which the Court has said is immaterial. It is
improbable that any application of the rule which would provide an
avenue for the abuse of justice was intended in its formulation.
However, where the line will be drawn is a matter of conjecture
only.
With the propostion that protection of the individual from delay
in presentment before a committing magistrate is a desirable end,
no issue is taken. That this protection can best be effected through
the imposition of an effective sanction upon police officers for failure
to effect prompt production is also accepted. However, in view of
the indefiniteness of scope of the rule of the principal case and its
possible employment as an abuse of justice, it is doubtful whether
the exclusion of confessions in this manner is the best solution to
the problem. It is submitted that Congress should develop some
appropriate sanctioning device that would effect the desired pro-
tection of the individual from illegal detention through means more
susceptible of definite application.
Bernard P. Bernardo
EvIDENCE-TESTIMONY OF JUROR TO IMPEACH VERDICT
In an action to recover damages for injuries claimed to have
been the result of stepping into a hole in the pavement of a safety
zone, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for the defendant. The
plaintiff moved for a new trial contending that one of the jurors
had visited the scene of the accident and reported to the others
that no such hole existed. The plaintiff offered testimony of the
jurors to prove this alleged misconduct. It was held inadmissible
by the trial court. Plaintiff appealed. Held, affirmed. In the ab-
sence of evidence aliunde, the verdict of a jury may not be im-
peached by the testimony of a juror concerning the alleged mis-
conduct of a member thereof. Wicker v. City of Cleveland, 150
Ohio St. 434, 83 N.E. 2d 56 (1949).
Excepting the phrase "In the absence of evidence aliunde," the
court's holding expresses the weight of authority in this country
and in England. McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1914) ; Johson
v. Hunter, 144 F. 2d 565 (10th Cir. 1944). This rule, first suggested
by Lord Mansfield in 1785 in the case of Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11
(K.B.), is founded on considerations of public policy. The courts
have theorized that to permit such testimony would encourage
"tampering" with jurors, would prolong litigation, would permit a
juror to prove his own reprehensible conduct, would upset sup-
posedly settled verdicts, and would interfere with the privacy of
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jury deliberation thus exposing jurors to public criticism. McDon-
ald v. Pless, supra; State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. 423, 48 N.E. 2d
861 (1943).
To this rule the Supreme Court of Ohio early ingrafted an ex-
tension permitting such testimony of jurors if there existed evi-
dence aliunde, i.e., evidence other than that to be had from the
jurors, concerning the misconduct. Farrar v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54,
1 Ohio Dec. Rep. 428 (1853). The court also adopted another ex-
tension which has had almost universal acceptance in other juris-
dictions, and which permits jurors to testify concerning the mis-
conduct of third parties such as court officers. Emmert v. State,
127 Ohio St. 235, 187 N.E. 862 (1933) ; State v. Adams, supra. In
remanding a case to the lower court, the Supreme Court also im-
plied that criminal cases may be outside the rule. Speaking of
criminal cases the court said in dictum that there was "doubt as to
whether there may not be found a carefully guarded exception" to
the rule. Goins v. State, 46 Ohio St. 457, 21 N.E. 476 (1889). With
these changes, the Ohio court has followed the majority doctrine.
Hulet v. Barnett, 10 Ohio 459 (1841) ; Hohman v. Riddle, 8 Ohio St.
384 (1858) ; Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884) ; Long v. Cas-
siero, 105 Ohio St. 123, 136 N.E. 888 (1922) ; Schwindt v. Graeif,
109 Ohio St. 404, 142 N.E. 736 (1924).
Applying this majority rule, courts have refused to admit the
testimony of jurors to show that the verdict was the result of
chance, Schwindt v. Graeff, supra; of consideration of evidence not
produced at the trial, Kent v. State, supra; of coercion, Johnson v.
Hunter, supra; and of a quotient method, McDonald v. Pless, supra.
This result insofar as the quotient method is concerned is probably
desirable in jurisdictions such as Ohio where the court has refused
to instruct the jury that the figure reached through the quotient
method must be expressly agreed upon after it has been deter-
mined; and that if this is not done, the use of this method would be
improper. Estridge v. Cinn. Street Ry. Co., 76 Ohio App. 220, 63
N.E. 2d 823 (1945). This rigid exclusion of what is generally the
only available evidence to show such misconduct has provoked con-
demnatory opinions which are exceedingly persuasive. See
Schwindt v. Graeff, supra (dissenting opinion) ; Wright v. Tele-
graph Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866). The authors of these attacks
reason that the danger of tampering with jurors is no greater than
would ordinarily exist if one of the parties was so inclined; that the
courts do not flinch at the prospect of prolonged litigation which
would ensue if evidence aliunde were admitted; that as is the prac-
tice with criminals, a repentant juror should be allowed to reveal
his misconduct; and that the ends of justice would be rightly served
if a settled, but unjust, verdict were disturbed. Desiring more
19491
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flexibility, some jurisdictions have adopted the so-called "Iowa
rule" which continues to exclude a juror's testimony concerning
matters inherent in the verdict, matters involving the motives
which were the basis for the verdict, but allows testimony involving
overt and extrinsic acts which may be observed and proved, or dis-
proved, by all the jurors. Southern Pacific Co. v. Klinge, 65 F. 2d
85 (10th Cir. 1933) ; Wright v. Telegraph Co., supra; Dallas Ry. &
Terminal Co. v. Bishop, 203 S.W. 2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947);
Turner & Sons v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W.
489 (1937) ; City of Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 So. 89 (1934).
This approach is substantive rather than procedural and the
trial court must necessarily consider the type of evidence sought to
be introduced by a juror's testimony to determine its admissibility.
Clawans v. Newman, 135 F. 2d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1943). Attempting
to do this, the courts have had considerable difficulty, inasmuch as
there is often only a slight and imperceptible difference between the
"inherent" and the "overt." 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2354 (3d
ed. 1940).
The federal court decisions vary. Some have followed the Iowa
rule. Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892) ; Jorgenson v.
York Ice Machinery Corp., 160 F. 2d 432 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 764 (1947) ; City of Amarillo v. Emery, 69 F. 2d
626 (5th Cir. 1934). Others represent the majority view. McDon-
aid v. Pless, supra; Johnson v. Hunter, supra; Bateman v. Donovan,
131 F. 2d 759 (9th Cir. 1942).
Some states have enacted statutes permitting the testimony of
jurors in cases where the misconduct consists of arriving at the
verdict by chance. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 657 (2) (1941) ;
IDAHO LAWS ANN. § 10-602 (2) (1948) ; CARROLL'S KY. CODE, CRIM.
PRAC. § 272 (1948) ; N. D. REV. CODE § 28-1902 (2) (1943) ; S. D.
CODE § 33.1605 (2) (1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 104-40-2 (2) (1943).
Texas statutes allow jurors to testify concerning any misconduct
which prevents a fair trial. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 753 (8)
(1925) ; TEX. RuLEs CIV. PROC. § 327 (1942). The Supreme Court
of Ohio on two occasions applied the majority rule with admitted
reluctance stating that because this rule had become the settled
law of Ohio it was not within the province of the court, but of the
legislature, to effet a change. Schwindt v. Graeff, supra; Kent v.
State, supra. It should be noted, however, that in other situations
the court has declared and utilized its power to overrule prior de-
cisions. Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55 (1869) ; Fowler v. City of
Cleveland, 100 Ohio St 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919).
J. Robert Donnelly
[Vol. 10264
RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL COURTS--REMOVAL UNDER THE JUDICIAL CODE
Plaintiff, resident of Iowa, employee of defendant railroad, was
injured in an accident in Iowa. Under the Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1946) he filed an action to recover for
injuries in the District Court for the Southern District of New
York. Defendant moved to transfer the case to the District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa, pursuant to Section 1404 (a) of
the new Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. CONG. SERV. § 1404 (a). Held,
motion granted. Nunn v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. Co.,
80 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
The FELA provides, "Under this chapter an action may be
brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of
the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of
commencing such action. . . ." 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1946). The Supreme
Court has held that this statute creates a privilege of venue which
could not be defeated by considerations of convenience or expense,
and that a state court could not enjoin an action begun in a distant
federal court in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Balti-
more & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44 (1941) ; Miles v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 (1942). In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501, 505 (1947) while holding the doctrine of forum non
conveniens applicable to cases governed by the general venue
statutes, declared, "It is true that in cases under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act we have held that plaintiff's choice of a forum
cannot be defeated on the basis-of forum non conveniens."
To defend the action in the principal case, the railroad would
have to bring twelve witnesses from Des Moines to New York. In
an earlier hearing in the Nunn case, 71 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y.
1947), before the enactment of the new Judicial Code, the railroad's
motion to dismiss on the grounds that the action in that forum con-
stituted an unlawful burden on interstate commerce was denied.
Citing the Miles and Kepner cases, supra, the court held that it
could not interfere as long as the statutory requirements of venue
were met. Accord: Butts v. Southern Pacific Co., 69 F. Supp. 895
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
Section 1404(a) of the new Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. CONG.
SERV. § 1404(a) (1948), the basis of the decision in the principal
case, provides, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
Despite the broad language of the statute, "any civil action," the
plaintiff contended that it was not intended to apply to actions
where the choice of forum was authorized by a special venue statute.
The court overruled the contention, citing the revisor's note as
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indicative of the Congressional intent in enacting the section. "Sub-
section (a) was drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, permitting transfer to a more convenient forum,
even though the venue is proper. As an example of the need of
such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner. . . . The
new subsection requires the court to determine that the transfer is
necessary for convenience of the parties and witnesses, and further,
that it is in the interest of justice to do so." 28 U.S.C. CONG. SERV.
1853 (1948). For examples of abuse of the venue privilege under
the FELA, see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens,
35 CALIF. L. REv. 380, 382 (1947).
Prior to the enactment of the new Judicial Code, the Supreme
Court had held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens was not
applicable to civil actions under the Clayton Act where venue is
chosen pursuant to Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1946). United States
v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948). Upon remand, District
Judge Yankwich held that Section 1404 (a) applied, and trans-
ferred the action to a more suitable district. "In so doing, I did not
weigh the convenience of the defenants only, but that of the Gov-
ernment also. The conclusion was arrived at after a balancing of
conveniences." United States v. National City Lines, 80 F. Supp.
734 (S.D. Cal. 1948). Similarly, in Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.
Co., 79 F. Supp 821 (D. Minn. 1948) actions by eight persons under
the FELA were transferred to district courts in Texas, Oklahoma,
and Illinois under Section 1404 (a) on the grounds that the con-
venience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice would
be best served by such transfer.
Two cases recently argued together before the Supreme Court
consider the effect of Section 1404 (a) on the special venue pro-
visions of the FELA and the Clayton Act. The opinion of the Court
in these cases, announced May 31, 1949, held that the language of
Section 1404 (a) was clear and that "any civil action" applies to all
civil actions. Accordingly, it upheld the transfer of these cases by
the District Court. Kilpatrick v. Texas Pacific Ry. Co.; United
States v. National City Lines, 17 U.S. L. WEEK, 4458 (1949).
Accord: Ex parte Collett, 17 U.S. L. WEEK, 4453 (1949).
Adherence to the rule of the principal case will not defeat the
considerations that prompted the granting of the choice of venue
to this class of plaintiffs. The plaintiff's initial choice of venue re-
mains as broad as before the 1948 revision; the action may still be
brought in any district in which the defendant may be served.
Under this streamlined concept of forum non conveniens the court
is not authorized to dismiss the action, but merely to transfer it to
a more convenient district if the interests of all parties will be
better served. Such a discretion vested in the federal judiciary
would appear to be in safe hands. Ralph N. Mahaffey
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SALES--IMPLIED WARRANTY-SELF-SERVICE STORES
Plaintiff was injured in a self-service store when a bottle con-
taining a carbonated beverage exploded as she transferred it to her
basket. In an action against the bottler for breach of implied
warranty, held, for defendant. Plaintiff must establish a sale or
contract of sale to come within the protection of Section 15 of the
Uniform Sales Act. In a self-service store, there is no contract or
sale until the goods are paid for. Loch v. Confair, 361 Pa. 158, 63
A. 2d 24 (1949).
Sales in early England were regulated by the Church and the
State to protect the community, penalties being imposed on delin-
quent sellers. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40
YALE L. J. 1133 (1931). By Blackstone's time, there was an implied
warranty that food was wholesome, with a remedy in case for deceit.
3 BL. COmm 165. Not until the nineteenth century, however, was
implied warranty given a contract basis. Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp.
144 (1815) ; Shepherd v. Pybus, 3 M. & G. 868 (1842). In this
country, even before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, the
rule was that sales of food carry an implied warranty of quality.
Hoover v. Peters, 18 Mich. 51 (1869) ; Rabb v. Covington, 215 N. C.
572, 2 S.E. 2d 705 (1939). At common law, the subpurchaser had
no cause of action against the manufacturer, privity of contract
being required. Hood v. Warren, 205 Ala. 332, 87 So. 524 (1921).
States with the Uniform Sales Act have the same requirement.
Vaccarino v. Cozzubo, 181 Md. 614, 31 A. 2d 316 (1943) ; Chysky v.
Drake Bros. Co. 235 N. Y. 468, 139 N. E. 576 (1923). Although
there is much support for the older rule, many courts have had no
difficulty in finding a basis for recovery, on the theory of public pol-
icy, Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d
828 (1942) ; Boyd v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 132 Tenn. 23, 177
S.W. 80 (1915) ; or that the consumer is a third party beneficiary
of the contract between the bottler and retailer, Coca Cola Bottling
Co. of Fort Worth v. Smith, 97 S.W. 2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ;
Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App. 475, 161 N. E. 557
(1928) ; or that the warranty runs with the product, Patargias v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162
(1947) ; Griffin v. Asbury, 196 Okla. 484, 165 P. 2d 822 (1945). In
the instant case, the court, sub silentio, espoused the view that priv-
ity was not required.
Even where the privity requirement is not an impediment,
other difficulties arise. Does the implied warranty extend to the
bottle? The court in the principal case did not have to answer that
question. Since the implied warranty of a restaurant extends to
the tableware, Sartin v. Blackwell, 200 Miss. 579, 28 So. 2d 222
(1946), it can be argued that the warranty of quality includes the
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bottle. It could also be argued that the broad language of Section
15-1 of the Uniform Sales Act includes the bottle, since after the
bottle has exploded, it is not fit for the particular purpose for which
it was purchased. It has been held that the warranty includes the
bottle. Naumann v. Wehle Brewery Co., 127 Conn. 44, 15 A. 2d 181
(1940); Haller v. Rudmann, 249 App. Div. 831, 292 N. Y. Supp.
586 (2d Dep't 1937). There is, however, authority to the contrary.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Butler, 180 S.W. 2d 996 (Tex. Civ. App.
1944).
Does the sale come within the prohibition of Section 15-4 of
the Uniform Sales Act, which provides that there is no implied
warranty where the sale is of a specified article by its trade name?
Notwithstanding this section, recovery has been allowed where the
food was purchased by trade name, on the basis of Section 15-2 of
the Act-that there is an implied warranty of merchantability in
sales by description, although the goods were purchased by trade
name. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N. Y. 388,
175 N.E. 105 (1931) ; Botti v. Venice Grocery Co., 309 Mass. 450,
35 N. E. 2d 491 (1941) ; D'Onofrio v. First National Stores, Inc.,
68 R.I. 144, 26 A. 2d 758 (1942).
The action against the bottler in the principal case may be
explained by the fact that a recent similar case, against the retailer
on implied warranty, failed for the same reasons. Lasky v. Econ-
omy Grocery Stores, 319 Mass. 224, 65 N.E. 2d 305 (1946). The
logical cause of action would be tort for negligence against the
bottler. However, althoughit is possible to get the issue before the
jury, Patargias v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, supra, the
burden of proving negligence is usually prohibitive. A possible
basis of recovery is that plaintiff is a business invitee, there being
a duty to use reasonable care to make the premises safe. PROSSER,
TORTS, § 79 (1941). Although the definition of business invitee
has been broadened, Crane v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 288, 144 P. 2d 356
(1943), the question of foreseeability which remains would be dif-
ficult to prove in the case of an exploding bottle. At this point res
ipsa loquitur should be a boon to injured plaintiffs. Res ipsa loqui-
tur has been a vehicle for getting to the jury in exploding bottle
cases against the manufacturer. Joly v. Jones, 115 Vt. 174, 55 A. 2d
181 (1947) ; Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W. 2d 1020 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1940). However, where the control by defendant has long
since ceased, it has been held necessary to prove that the explosion
could not have been brought about by any intervening cause. Piacun
v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 33 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 1947) ;
Payne v. Rome Coca Cola Bottling Co., 10 Ga. App. 762, 73 S.E.
1087 (1912). The burden of this requirement is commensurate with
that of proving negligence, and res ipsa loquitur being only a means
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of relying on the vacillations of jurors, a more concrete basis of
recovery is needed. (It should be noted that the possibilities of
an action against the owner of the premises, based on res ipsa
loquitur, have not been explored. Should there be any difference
between an exploding bottle and a falling cornice?)
More cogent is the argument that the sale is one by description,
the warranty of merchantability of Section 15-2 applying. Botti v.
Venice Grocery Co., supra; D'Onofrio v. First National Stores,
supra; Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, supra. Those cases,
however, did not involve self-service markets so the question of sale
or contract of sale remains.
The most suitable basis of recovery is by the implied warranty
of the Uniform Sales Act. Recovery on implied warranty has not
been limited to sales, but has been extended to bailment for hire,
The White Company v. Francis, 95 Pa. Super. 315 (1928), and to
the furnishing of food to customers by restaurants. Cushing v.
Rodman, 82 F. 2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936) ; Friend v. Childs Dining
Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918). Nevertheless, it is not
necessary to resort to tenuous extensions of present rules. The
principal case can well come within the confines of the Uniform
Sales Act. In the old-fashioned grocery store, offer by the customer
and acceptance by the storekeeper was a single, simple transaction.
It can well be argued that the revolution in sales technique through
the self-service store, with its concomitant benefits to owners and
dangers to customers, has affected a change in the contractual re-
lation. To a customer who has put .the last can of cherries in his
basket, can the manager say there is no contract of sale and give
the can to another? The owner, by inviting customers into his
store to select their own articles, offers them to those customers.
The offer is accepted when the goods are picked up, creating a con-
tract of sale. The fact that the article may be returned to the shelf
if of no moment. Right of customers to return an article does not
preclude a contract of sale. WILLISTON, SALES § 270 (1948). There
being a contract of sale, plaintiff should come within Section 15
of the Uniform Sales Act.
Jack R. Alton
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